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ABSTRACT
We study the problem of model extraction in natural language processing, in
which an adversary with only query access to a victim model attempts to recon-
struct a local copy of that model. Assuming that both the adversary and victim
model fine-tune a large pretrained language model such as BERT (Devlin et al.,
2019), we show that the adversary does not need any real training data to success-
fully mount the attack. In fact, the attacker need not even use grammatical or se-
mantically meaningful queries: we show that random sequences of words coupled
with task-specific heuristics form effective queries for model extraction on a di-
verse set of NLP tasks including natural language inference and question answer-
ing. Our work thus highlights an exploit only made feasible by the shift towards
transfer learning methods within the NLP community: for a query budget of a few
hundred dollars, an attacker can extract a model that performs only slightly worse
than the victim model. Finally, we study two defense strategies against model
extraction—membership classification and API watermarking—which while suc-
cessful against naive adversaries, are ineffective against more sophisticated ones.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning models represent valuable intellectual property: the process of gathering training
data, iterating over model design, and tuning hyperparameters costs considerable money and effort.
As such, these models are often only indirectly accessible through web APIs that allow users to
query a model but not inspect its parameters. Malicious users might try to sidestep the expensive
model development cycle by instead locally reproducing an existing model served by such an API.
In these attacks, known as “model stealing” or “model extraction” (Lowd & Meek, 2005; Trame`r
et al., 2016), the adversary issues a large number of queries and uses the collected (input, output)
pairs to train a local copy of the model. Besides theft of intellectual property, extracted models
may leak sensitive information about the training data (Trame`r et al., 2016) or be used to generate
adversarial examples that evade the model served by the API (Papernot et al., 2017).
With the recent success of contextualized pretrained representations for transfer learning, NLP mod-
els created by finetuning ELMo (Peters et al., 2018) and BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) have become
increasingly popular (Gardner et al., 2018). Contextualized pretrained representations boost perfor-
mance and reduce sample complexity (Yogatama et al., 2019), and typically require only a shallow
task-specific network—sometimes just a single layer as in BERT. While these properties are advan-
tageous for representation learning, we hypothesize that they also make model extraction easier.
In this paper, we demonstrate that NLP models obtained by fine-tuning a pretrained BERT model can
be extracted even if the adversary does not have access to any training data used by the API provider.
In fact, the adversary does not even need to issue well-formed queries: our experiments show that
extraction attacks are possible even with queries consisting of randomly sampled sequences of words
∗Work done during an internship at Google Research.
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Figure 1: Overview of our model extraction setup for question answering.1An attacker first queries
a victim BERT model, and then uses its predicted answers to fine-tune their own BERT model. This
process works even when passages and questions are random sequences of words as shown here.
coupled with simple task-specific heuristics (Section 3). While extraction performance improves
further by leveraging sentences and paragraphs from Wikipedia (Section 4), the fact that random
word sequences are sufficient to extract models contrasts with prior work, where large-scale attacks
require at minimum that the adversary can access a small amount of semantically-coherent data
relevant to the task (Papernot et al., 2017; Correia-Silva et al., 2018; Orekondy et al., 2019a; Pal
et al., 2019; Jagielski et al., 2019). These attacks are cheap; our most expensive attack cost around
$500, estimated using rates of current API providers.
In Section 5.1, we perform a fine-grained analysis of the randomly-generated queries. Human stud-
ies on the random queries show that despite their effectiveness in extracting good models, they are
mostly nonsensical and uninterpretable, although queries closer to the original data distribution work
better for extraction. Furthermore, we discover that pretraining on the attacker’s side makes model
extraction easier (Section 5.2).
Finally, we study the efficacy of two simple defenses against extraction — membership classification
(Section 6.1) and API watermarking (Section 6.2) — and find that while they work well against naive
adversaries, they fail against adversaries who adapt to the defense. We hope that our work spurs
future research into stronger defenses against model extraction and, more generally, on developing
a better understanding of why these models and datasets are particularly vulnerable to such attacks.
2 RELATED WORK
We relate our work to prior efforts on model extraction, most of which have focused on computer
vision applications. Because of the way in which we synthesize queries for extracting models, our
work also directly relates to zero-shot distillation and studies of rubbish inputs to NLP systems.
Model extraction attacks have been studied both empirically (Trame`r et al., 2016; Orekondy et al.,
2019a; Juuti et al., 2019) and theoretically (Chandrasekaran et al., 2018; Milli et al., 2019), mostly
against image classification APIs. These works generally synthesize queries in an active learning
setup by searching for inputs that lie close to the victim classifier’s decision boundaries. This method
does not transfer to text-based systems due to the discrete nature of the input space.2 The only
prior work attempting extraction on NLP systems is Pal et al. (2019), who adopt pool-based active
learning to select natural sentences from WikiText-2 and extract 1-layer CNNs for tasks expecting
single inputs. In contrast, we study a more realistic extraction setting with nonsensical inputs on
modern BERT-large models for tasks expecting pairwise inputs like question answering.
1The BERT clipart in this figure was originally used in http://jalammar.github.io/
illustrated-bert/.
2In our initial experiments we tried equivalent active learning algorithms with the HotFlip algo-
rithm (Ebrahimi et al., 2018) but had limited success.
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Task RANDOM example WIKI example
SST2 cent 1977, preparation (120 remote Program finance add
broader protection ( 76.54% negative)
So many were produced that thousands were Brown’s by
coin 1973 (98.59% positive)
MNLI P: Mike zone fights Woods Second State known, defined
come
H: Mike zone released, Woods Second HMS males defined
come (99.89% contradiction)
P: voyage have used a variety of methods to Industrial their
Trade
H: descent have used a officially of methods exhibition In-
dustrial their Trade (99.90% entailment)
SQuAD P: a of Wood, curate him and the ” Stop Alumni terrestrial
the of of roads Kashyap. Space study with the Liverpool,
Wii Jordan night Sarah lbf a Los the Australian three En-
glish who have that that health officers many new work-
force...
Q: How workforce. Stop who new of Jordan et Wood, dis-
played the?
A: Alumni terrestrial the of of roads Kashyap
P: Since its release, Dookie has been featured heavily in
various “must have” lists compiled by the music media.
Some of the more prominent of these lists to feature Dookie
are shown below; this information is adapted from Ac-
claimed Music.
Q: What are lists feature prominent ” adapted Acclaimed
are various information media.?
A: “must have”
Table 1: Representative examples from the extraction datasets, highlighting the effect of task-
specific heuristics in MNLI and SQuAD. More examples in Appendix A.5.
Our work is related to prior work on data-efficient distillation, which attempts to distill knowledge
from a larger model to a small model with access to limited input data (Li et al., 2018) or in a zero-
shot setting (Micaelli & Storkey, 2019; Nayak et al., 2019). However, unlike the model extraction
setting, these methods assume white-box access to the teacher model to generate data impressions.
Rubbish inputs, which are randomly-generated examples that yield high-confidence predictions,
have received some attention in the model extraction literature. Prior work (Trame`r et al., 2016)
reports successful extraction on SVMs and 1-layer networks using i.i.d noise, but no prior work
has scaled this idea to deeper neural networks for which a single class tends to dominate model
predictions on most noise inputs (Micaelli & Storkey, 2019; Pal et al., 2019). Unnatural text in-
puts have previously been shown to produce overly confident model predictions (Feng et al., 2018),
break translation systems (Belinkov & Bisk, 2018), and trigger disturbing outputs from text genera-
tors (Wallace et al., 2019). In contrast, here we show their effectiveness at training models that work
well on real NLP tasks despite not seeing any real examples during training.
3 METHODOLOGY
What is BERT? We study model extraction on BERT, Bidirectional Encoder Representations from
Transformers (Devlin et al., 2019). BERT-large is a 24-layer transformer (Vaswani et al., 2017),
fbert,θ, which converts a word sequence x = (x1, ..., xn) of length n into a high-quality sequence of
vector representations v = (v1, ...,vn). These representations are contextualized — every vector vi
is conditioned on the whole sequence x. BERT’s parameters θ∗ are learnt using masked language
modelling on a large unlabelled corpus of natural text. The public release of fbert,θ∗ revolution-
ized NLP, as it achieved state-of-the-art performance on a wide variety of NLP tasks with minimal
task-specific supervision. A modern NLP system for task T typically leverages the fine-tuning
methodology in the public BERT repository:3 a task-specific network fT,φ (generally, a 1-layer
feedforward network) with parameters φ expecting v as input is used to construct a composite func-
tion gT = fT,φ ◦ fbert,θ. The final parameters φT , θT are learned end-to-end using training data for
T with a small learning rate (“fine-tuning”), with φ initialized randomly and θ initialized with θ∗.
Description of extraction attacks: Assume gT (the “victim model”) is a commercially available
black-box API for task T . A malicious user with black-box query access to gT attempts to recon-
struct a local copy g′T (the “extracted model”). Since the attacker does not have training data for T ,
they use a task-specific query generator to construct several possibly nonsensical word sequences
{xi}m1 as queries to the victim model. The resulting dataset {xi, gT (xi)}m1 is used to train g′T .
Specifically, we assume that the attacker fine-tunes the public release of fbert,θ∗ on this dataset to
obtain g′T .
4 A schematic of our extraction attacks is shown in Figure 1.
3https://github.com/google-research/bert
4We experiment with alternate attacker networks in Section 5.2.
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Task # Queries Cost Model Accuracy Agreement
SST2 67349 $62.35 VICTIM 93.1% -
RANDOM 90.1% 92.8%
WIKI 91.4% 94.9%
WIKI-ARGMAX 91.3% 94.2%
MNLI 392702 $387.82* VICTIM 85.8% -
RANDOM 76.3% 80.4%
WIKI 77.8% 82.2%
WIKI-ARGMAX 77.1% 80.9%
SQuAD 1.1 87599 $115.01* VICTIM 90.6 F1, 83.9 EM -
RANDOM 79.1 F1, 68.5 EM 78.1 F1, 66.3 EM
WIKI 86.1 F1, 77.1 EM 86.6 F1, 77.6 EM
BoolQ 9427 $5.42* VICTIM 76.1% -
WIKI 66.8% 72.5%
WIKI-ARGMAX 66.0% 73.0%
471350 $516.05* WIKI (50x data) 72.7% 84.7%
Table 2: A comparison of the original API (VICTIM) with extracted models (RANDOM and WIKI) in
terms of Accuracy on the original development set and Agreement between the extracted and victim
model on the development set inputs. Notice high accuracies for extracted models. Unless specified,
all extraction attacks were conducted use the same number of queries as the original training dataset.
The * marked costs are estimates from available Google APIs (details in Appendix A.2).
NLP tasks: We extract models on four diverse NLP tasks that have different kinds of input and
output spaces: (1) binary sentiment classification using SST2 (Socher et al., 2013), where the input
is a single sentence and the output is a probability distribution between positive and negative; (2)
ternary natural language inference (NLI) classification using MNLI (Williams et al., 2018), where
the input is a pair of sentences and the output is a distribution between entailment, contradiction and
neutral; (3) extractive question answering (QA) using SQuAD 1.1 (Rajpurkar et al., 2016), where
the input is a paragraph and question and the output is an answer span from the paragraph; and (4)
boolean question answering using BoolQ (Clark et al., 2019), where the input is a paragraph and
question and the output is a distribution between yes and no.
Query generators: We study two kinds of query generators, RANDOM and WIKI. In the RANDOM
generator, an input query is a nonsensical sequence of words constructed by sampling5 a Wikipedia
vocabulary built from WikiText-103 (Merity et al., 2017). In the WIKI setting, input queries are
formed from actual sentences or paragraphs from the WikiText-103 corpus. We found these two
generators insufficient by themselves to extract models for tasks featuring complex interactions be-
tween different parts of the input space (e.g., between premise and hypothesis in MNLI or question
and paragraph in SQuAD). Hence, we additionally apply the following task-specific heuristics:
• MNLI: since the premise and hypothesis often share many words, we randomly replace
three words in the premise with three random words to construct the hypothesis.
• SQuAD / BoolQ: since questions often contain words in the associated passage, we uni-
formly sample words from the passage to form a question. We additionally prepend a
question starter word (like “what”) to the question and append a ? symbol to the end.
Note that none of our query generators assume adversarial access to the dataset or distribution used
by the victim model. For more details on the query generation, see Appendix A.3. Representative ex-
ample queries and their outputs are shown in Table 1. More examples are provided in Appendix A.5.
5We use uniform random sampling for SST2 / MNLI and unigram frequency-based sampling for SQuAD /
BoolQ. Empirically, we found this setup to be the most effective in model extraction.
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Task Model 0.1x 0.2x 0.5x 1x 2x 5x 10x
SST2 VICTIM 90.4 92.1 92.5 93.1 - - -
RANDOM 75.9 87.5 89.0 90.1 90.5 90.4 90.1
(1x = 67349) WIKI 89.6 90.6 91.7 91.4 91.6 91.2 91.4
MNLI VICTIM 81.9 83.1 85.1 85.8 - - -
RANDOM 59.1 70.6 75.7 76.3 77.5 78.5 77.6
(1x = 392702) WIKI 68.0 71.6 75.9 77.8 78.9 79.7 79.3
SQuAD 1.1 VICTIM 84.1 86.6 89.0 90.6 - - -
RANDOM 60.6 68.5 75.8 79.1 81.9 84.8 85.8
(1x = 87599) WIKI 72.4 79.6 83.8 86.1 87.4 88.4 89.4
BoolQ VICTIM 63.3 64.6 69.9 76.1 - - -
(1x = 9427) WIKI 62.1 63.1 64.7 66.8 67.6 69.8 70.3
Table 3: Development set accuracy of various extracted models on the original development set at
different query budgets expressed as fractions of the original dataset size. Note the high accuracies
for some tasks even at low query budgets, and diminishing accuracy gains at higher budgets.
4 EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION OF OUR MODEL EXTRACTION ATTACKS
First, we evaluate our extraction procedure in a controlled setting where an attacker uses an identi-
cal number of queries as the original training dataset (Table 2); afterwards, we investigate different
query budgets for each task (Table 3). We provide commercial cost estimates for these query bud-
gets using the Google Cloud Platform’s Natural Language API calculator.6 We use two metrics
for evaluation: Accuracy of the extracted models on the original development set, and Agreement
between the outputs of the extracted model and the victim model on the original development set
inputs. Note that these metrics are defined at a label level — metrics are calculated using the argmax
labels of the probability vectors predicted by the victim and extracted model.
In our controlled setting (Table 2), our extracted models are surprisingly accurate on the original
development sets of all tasks, even when trained with nonsensical inputs (RANDOM) that do not
match the original data distribution.7 Accuracy improves further on WIKI: extracted SQuAD models
recover 95% of original accuracy despite seeing only nonsensical questions during training. While
extracted models have high accuracy, their agreement is only slightly better than accuracy in most
cases. Agreement is even lower on held-out sets constructed using the WIKI and RANDOM sampling
scheme. On SQuAD, extracted WIKI and RANDOM have low agreements of 59.2 F1 and 50.5 F1
despite being trained on identically distributed data. This indicates poor functional equivalence
between the victim and extracted model as also found by Jagielski et al. (2019). An ablation study
with alternative query generation heuristics for SQuAD and MNLI is conducted in Appendix A.4.
Classification with argmax labels only: For classification datasets, we assumed the API returns a
probability distribution over output classes. This information may not be available to the adversary
in practice. To measure what happens when the API only provides argmax outputs, we re-run our
WIKI experiments for SST2, MNLI and BoolQ with argmax labels and present our results in Table 2
(WIKI-ARGMAX). We notice a minimal drop in accuracy from the corresponding WIKI experiments,
indicating that access to the output probability distribution is not crucial for model extraction. Hence,
hiding the full probability distribution is not a viable defense strategy.
Query efficiency: We measure the effectiveness of our extraction algorithms with varying query
budgets, each a different fraction of the original dataset size, in Table 3. Even with small query
6The calculator can be found in https://cloud.google.com/products/calculator/. Since
Google Cloud’s API does not provide NLI and QA models, we base our estimates off the costs of the Entity
Analysis and Sentiment Analysis APIs. All costs calculated on the original datasets by counting every 1000
characters of the input as a different unit. More details on pricing in Appendix A.2.
7We omit BoolQ / RANDOM from the table as it failed to converge, possibly due to either the sparse signal
from yes / no outputs for a relatively complex classification task, or the poor accuracy of the victim model which
reduces extraction signal. The victim model achieves just 76.1% binary accuracy compared to the majority class
of 62.1%.
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Figure 2: Average dev F1 for extracted SQuAD models after selecting different subsets of data from
a large pool of WIKI and RANDOM data. Subsets are selected based on the agreement between the
outputs of different runs of the original SQuAD model. Notice the large difference between the
highest agreement (blue) and the lowest agreement (green), especially at small dataset sizes.
budgets, extraction is often successful; while more queries is usually better, accuracy gains quickly
diminish. Approximate costs for these attacks can be extrapolated from Table 2.
5 ANALYSIS
These results bring many natural questions to mind. What properties of nonsensical input queries
make them so amenable to the model extraction process? How well does extraction work for these
tasks without using large pretrained language models? In this section, we perform an analysis to
answer these questions.
5.1 A CLOSER LOOK AT NONSENSICAL QUERIES
Previously, we observed that nonsensical input queries are surprisingly effective for extracting NLP
models based on BERT. Here, we dig into the properties of these queries in an attempt to understand
why models trained on them perform so well. Do different victim models produce the same answer
when given a nonsensical query? Are some of these queries more representative of the original data
distribution than others? Did our task-specific heuristics perhaps make these nonsensical queries
“interpretable” to humans in some way? We specifically examine the RANDOM and WIKI extraction
configurations for SQuAD in this section to answer these questions.
Do different victim models agree on the answers to nonsensical queries? We train five victim
SQuAD models on the original training data with identical hyperparameters, varying only the ran-
dom seed; each achieves an F1 of between 90 and 90.5. Then, we measure the average pairwise
F1 (“agreement”) between the answers produced by these models for different types of queries. As
expected, the models agree very frequently when queries come from the SQuAD training set (96.9
F1) or development set (90.4 F1). However, their agreement drops significantly on WIKI queries
(53.0 F1) and even further on RANDOM queries (41.2 F1).8
Are high-agreement queries closer to the original data distribution? While these results indicate
that on average, victim models tend to be brittle on nonsensical inputs, it is possible that high-
agreement queries are more useful than others for model extraction. To measure this, we sort queries
from our 10x RANDOM and WIKI datasets according to their agreement and choose the highest
and lowest agreement subsets, where subset size is a varying fraction of the original training data
size (Figure 2). We observe large F1 improvements when extracting models using high-agreement
subsets, consistently beating random and low-agreement subsets of identical sizes. This result shows
that agreement between victim models is a good proxy for the quality of an input-output pair for
extraction. Measuring this agreement in extracted models and integrating this observation into an
active learning objective for better extraction is an interesting direction that we leave to future work.
8We plot a histogram of the agreement in Appendix A.1.
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Are high-agreement nonsensical queries interpretable to humans? Prior work (Xu et al., 2016;
Ilyas et al., 2019) has shown deep neural networks can leverage non-robust, uninterpretable features
to learn classifiers. Our nonsensical queries are not completely random, as we do apply task-specific
heuristics. Perhaps as a result of these heuristics, do high-agreement nonsensical textual inputs
have a human interpretation? To investigate, we asked three human annotators9 to answer twenty
SQuAD questions from each of the WIKI and RANDOM subsets that had unanimous agreement
among victim models, and twenty original SQuAD questions as a control. On the WIKI subset,
annotators matched the victim models’ answer exactly 23% of the time (33 F1). Similarly, a 22%
exact match (32 F1) was observed on RANDOM. In contrast, annotators scored significantly higher
on original SQuAD questions (77% exact match, 85 F1 against original answers). Interviews with
the annotators revealed a common trend: annotators used a word overlap heuristic (between the
question and paragraph) to select entities as answer spans. While this heuristic partially interprets
the extraction data’s signal, most of the nonsensical question-answer pairs remain mysterious to
humans. More details on inter-annotator agreement are provided in Appendix A.6.
5.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF PRETRAINING
So far we assumed that the victim and the attacker both fine-tune a pretrained BERT-large model.
However, in practical scenarios, the attacker might not have information about the victim architec-
ture. What happens when the attacker fine-tunes a different base model than the victim? What if the
attacker extracts a QA model from scratch instead of fine-tuning a large pretrained language model?
Here, we examine how much the extraction accuracy depends on the pretraining setup.
Victim Attacker MNLI SQuAD (WIKI)
BERT-large BERT-large 77.8% 86.1 F1, 77.1 EM
BERT-base BERT-large 76.3% 84.2 F1, 74.8 EM
BERT-base BERT-base 75.7% 83.0 F1, 73.4 EM
BERT-large BERT-base 72.5% 81.2 F1, 71.3 EM
Table 4: Development set accuracy using WIKI queries on
MNLI and SQuAD with mismatched BERT architectures
between the victim and attacker. Note the trend: (large,
large) > (base, large) > (base, base) > (large, base) where
the (·, ·) refers to (victim, attacker) pretraining.
Mismatched BERT architectures:
BERT comes in two different sizes:
the 24 layer BERT-large and the 12
layer BERT-base. In Table 4, we mea-
sure the development set accuracy on
MNLI and SQuAD when the victim
and attacker use different configura-
tions of these two models.
Accuracy is always higher when the
attacker starts from BERT-large, even
when the victim was initialized with
BERT-base. Additionally, given a
fixed attacker architecture, accuracy is
better when the victim uses the same
model (e.g., if the attacker starts from
BERT-base, they will have better results if the victim also used BERT-base). This is reminiscent of
similar discussion in Trame`r et al. (2016) on Occam Learning or appropriate alignment of victim-
extraction architectures. Overall, the results suggest that attackers can maximize their accuracy by
fine-tuning more powerful language models, and that matching architectures is a secondary concern.
Input Output + GloVE - GloVE
TRUE X TRUE Y 79.6 F1 70.6 F1
TRUE X BERT-LARGE Y 79.5 F1 70.3 F1
RANDOM X BERT-LARGE Y 55.9 F1 43.2 F1
WIKI X BERT-LARGE Y 58.9 F1 54.0 F1
Table 5: SQuAD dev set results on QANet, with and
without GloVE (Pennington et al., 2014). Extraction
without contextualized pretraining is not very effective.
What if we train from scratch? Fine-
tuning BERT seems to give attackers a
significant headstart, as only the final
layer of the model is randomly initial-
ized and the BERT parameters start from
a good representation of language. To
measure the importance of fine-tuning
from a good starting point, we train
a QANet model (Yu et al., 2018) on
SQuAD with no contextualized pretrain-
ing. This model has 1.3 million randomly
initialized parameters at the start of train-
ing. Table 5 shows that QANet achieves
9Annotators were English-speaking graduate students who voluntarily agreed to participate and were com-
pletely unfamiliar with our research goals.
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high accuracy when original SQuAD inputs are used (TRUE X) with BERT-large labels, indicat-
ing sufficient model capacity. However, the F1 significantly degrades when training on nonsensical
RANDOM and WIKI queries. The F1 drop is particularly striking when compared to the correspond-
ing rows in Table 2 (only 4.5 F1 drop for WIKI). This reinforces our finding that better pretraining
allows models to start from a good representation of language, thus simplifying extraction.
6 DEFENSES
Having established that BERT-based models are vulnerable to model extraction, we now shift our
focus to investigating defense strategies. An ideal defense preserves API utility (Orekondy et al.,
2019b) while remaining undetectable to attackers (Szyller et al., 2019); furthermore, it is convenient
if the defense does not require re-training the victim model. Here we explore two defenses that
satisfy these properties. Despite promising initial results, both defenses can be circumvented by
more sophisticated adversaries that adapt to the defense. Hence, more work is needed to make
models robust to model extraction.
6.1 MEMBERSHIP CLASSIFICATION
Our first defense uses membership inference, which is traditionally used to determine whether a
classifier was trained on a particular input point (Shokri et al., 2017; Nasr et al., 2018). In our
setting we use membership inference for “outlier detection”, where nonsensical and ungrammatical
inputs (which are unlikely to be issued by a legitimate user) are identified (Papernot & McDaniel,
2018). When such out-of-distribution inputs are detected, the API issues a random output instead of
the model’s predicted output, which eliminates the extraction signal.
Task WIKI RANDOM SHUFFLE
MNLI 99.3% 99.1% 87.4%
SQuAD 98.8% 99.9% 99.7%
Table 6: Accuracy of membership classi-
fiers on an identically distributed develop-
ment set (WIKI) and differently distributed
test sets (RANDOM, SHUFFLE).
We treat membership inference as a binary classifi-
cation problem, constructing datasets for MNLI and
SQuAD by labeling their original training and valida-
tion examples as real and WIKI extraction examples as
fake. We use the logits in addition to the final layer
representations of the victim model as input features
to train the classifier, as model confidence scores and
rare word representations are useful for membership
inference (Song & Shmatikov, 2019; Hisamoto et al.,
2019). Table 6 shows that these classifiers transfer well
to a balanced development set with the same distribu-
tion as their training data (WIKI). They are also robust
to the query generation process: accuracy remains high on auxiliary test sets where fake examples
are either RANDOM (described in Section 3) or SHUFFLE, in which the word order of real examples
is shuffled. An ablation study on the input features of the classifier is provided in Appendix A.7.
Model Unanswerable Answerable Overall
VICTIM 78.8 F1 82.1 F1 80.4 F1
RANDOM 70.9 F1 26.6 F1 48.8 F1
WIKI 61.1 F1 67.6 F1 64.3 F1
Table 7: Limited model extraction success on SQuAD
2.0 which includes unanswerable questions. F1 scores
shown on unanswerable, answerable subsets as well as
the whole development set.
Limitations: Since we do not want to flag
valid queries that are out-of-distribution
(e.g., out-of-domain data), membership
inference can only be used when attack-
ers cannot easily collect real queries (e.g.,
tasks with complex input spaces such as
NLI, QA, or low-resource MT). Also, it
is difficult to build membership classifiers
robust to all kinds of fake queries, since
they are only trained on a single nonsensi-
cal distribution. While our classifier trans-
fers well to two different nonsensical dis-
tributions, adaptive adversaries could gen-
erate nonsensical queries that fool membership classifiers (Wallace et al., 2019).
Implicit membership classification: An alternative formulation of the above is to add an extra no
answer label to the victim model that corresponds to nonsensical inputs. We explore this setting by
experimenting with a victim BERT-large model trained on SQuAD 2.0 (Rajpurkar et al., 2018), in
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Watermarked Training Subset
Task Model Epochs Dev Acc WM Label Acc Victim Label Acc
MNLI WIKI 3 77.8% 2.8% 94.4%
watermarked WIKI 3 77.3% 52.8% 35.4%
watermarked WIKI 10 76.8% 87.2% 7.9%
MNLI WIKI-ARGMAX 3 77.1% 1.0% 98.0%
watermarked WIKI-ARGMAX 3 76.3% 55.1% 35.7%
watermarked WIKI-ARGMAX 10 75.9% 94.6% 3.3%
SQuAD WIKI 3 86.2 F1 0.2 F1, 0.0 EM 96.7 F1, 94.3 EM
watermarked WIKI 3 86.3 F1 16.9 F1, 5.7 EM 28.0 F1, 14.9 EM
watermarked WIKI 10 84.8 F1 76.3 F1, 74.7 EM 4.1 F1, 1.1 EM
Table 8: Results on watermarked models. Dev Acc represents the overall development set accuracy,
WM Label Acc denotes the accuracy of predicting the watermarked output on the watermarked
queries and Victim Label Acc denotes the accuracy of predicting the original labels on the water-
marked queries. A watermarked WIKI has high WM Label Acc and low Victim Label Acc.
which 33.4% of questions are unanswerable. 97.2% of RANDOM queries and 78.6% of WIKI queries
are marked unanswerable by the victim model, which hampers extraction (Table 7) by limiting in-
formation about answerable questions. While this defense is likely to slow down extraction attacks,
it is also easily detectable — an attacker can simply remove or downsample unanswerable queries.
6.2 WATERMARKING
Another defense against extraction is watermarking (Szyller et al., 2019), in which a tiny fraction of
queries are chosen at random and modified to return a wrong output. These “watermarked queries”
and their outputs are stored on the API side. Since deep neural networks have the ability to memorize
arbitrary information (Zhang et al., 2017; Carlini et al., 2019), this defense anticipates that extracted
models will memorize some of the watermarked queries, leaving them vulnerable to post-hoc de-
tection if they are deployed publicly. We evaluate watermarking on MNLI (by randomly permuting
the predicted probability vector to ensure a different argmax output) and SQuAD (by returning a
single word answer which has less than 0.2 F1 overlap with the actual output). For both tasks, we
watermark just 0.1% of all queries to minimize the overall drop in API performance.
Table 8 shows that extracted models perform nearly identically on the development set (Dev Acc)
with or without watermarking. When looking at the watermarked subset of the training data, how-
ever, non-watermarked models get nearly everything wrong (low WM Label Acc%) as they gen-
erally predict the victim model’s outputs (high Victim Label Acc%), while watermarked models
behave oppositely. Training with more epochs only makes these differences more drastic.
Limitations: Watermarking works, but it is not a silver bullet for two reasons. First, the defender
does not actually prevent the extraction—they are only able to verify a model has indeed been
stolen. Moreover, it assumes that an attacker will deploy an extracted model publicly, allowing the
defender to query the (potentially) stolen model. It is thus irrelevant if the attacker instead keeps
the model private. Second, an attacker who anticipates watermarking can take steps to prevent
detection, including (1) differentially private training on extraction data (Dwork et al., 2014; Abadi
et al., 2016); (2) fine-tuning or re-extracting an extracted model with different queries (Chen et al.,
2019; Szyller et al., 2019); or (3) issuing random outputs on queries exactly matching inputs in the
extraction data. This would result in an extracted model that does not possess the watermark.
7 CONCLUSION
We study model extraction attacks against NLP APIs that serve BERT-based models. These attacks
are surprisingly effective at extracting good models with low query budgets, even when an attacker
uses nonsensical input queries. Our results show that fine-tuning large pretrained language models
simplifies the process of extraction for an attacker. Unfortunately, existing defenses against extrac-
tion, while effective in some scenarios, are generally inadequate, and further research is necessary to
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develop defenses robust in the face of adaptive adversaries who develop counter-attacks anticipating
simple defenses. Other interesting future directions that follow from the results in this paper include
1) leveraging nonsensical inputs to improve model distillation on tasks for which it is difficult to
procure input data; 2) diagnosing dataset complexity by using query efficiency as a proxy; 3) further
investigation of the agreement between victim models as a method to identify proximity in input
distribution and its incorporation into an active learning setup for model extraction.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 DISTRIBUTION OF AGREEMENT
We provide a distribution of agreement between victim SQuAD models on RANDOM and WIKI
queries in Figure 3.
A.2 QUERY PRICING
In this paper, we have used the cost estimate from Google Cloud Platform’s Calculator.10 The
Natural Language APIs typically allows inputs of length up to 1000 characters per query (https:
//cloud.google.com/natural-language/pricing). To calculate costs for different
datasets, we counted input instances with more than 1000 characters multiple times.
Since Google Cloud did not have APIs for all tasks we study in this paper, we extrapolated the
costs of the entity analysis and sentiment analysis APIs for natural language inference (MNLI) and
reading comprehension (SQuAD, BoolQ). We believe this is a reasonable estimate since every model
studied in this paper is a single layer in addition to BERT-large (thereby needing a similar number
of FLOPs for similar input lengths).
It is hard to provide a widely applicable estimate for the price of issuing a certain number of queries.
Several API providers allow a small budget of free queries. An attacker could conceivably set up
multiple accounts and collect extraction data in a distributed fashion. In addition, most APIs are
implicitly used on webpages — they are freely available to web users (such as Google Search or
Maps). If sufficient precautions are not taken, an attacker could easily emulate the HTTP requests
10https://cloud.google.com/products/calculator/
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Figure 3: Histogram of average F1 agreement between five different runs of BERT question answer-
ing models trained on the original SQuAD dataset. Notice the higher agreement on points in the
WIKI dataset compared to RANDOM.
used to call these APIs and extract information at a large scale, free of cost (“web scraping”). Besides
these factors, API costs could also vary significantly depending on the computing infrastructure
involved or the revenue model of the company deploying them.
Given these caveats, it is important to focus on the relatively low costs needed to extract datasets
rather than the actual cost estimates. Even complex text generation tasks like machine translation and
speech recognition (for which Google Cloud has actual API estimates) are relatively inexpensive.
It costs - $430.56 to extract Switchboard LDC97S62 (Godfrey et al., 1992), a large conversational
speech recognition dataset with 300 hours of speech; $2000.00 to issue 1 million translation queries,
each having a length of 100 characters.
A.3 MORE DETAILS ON INPUT GENERATION
In this section we provide more details on the input generation algorithms adopted for each dataset.
(SST2, RANDOM) - A vocabulary is built using wikitext103. The top 10000 tokens (in terms of
unigram frequency in wikitext103) are preserved while the others are discarded. A length is chosen
from the pool of wikitext-103 sentence lengths. Tokens are uniformly randomly sampled from the
top-10000 wikitext103 vocabulary up to the chosen length.
(SST2, WIKI) - A vocabulary is built using wikitext103. The top 10000 tokens (in terms of unigram
frequency in wikitext103) are preserved while the others are discarded. A sentence is chosen at
random from wikitext103. Words in the sentence which do not belong to the top-10000 wikitext103
vocabulary are replaced with words uniformly randomly chosen from this vocabulary.
(MNLI, RANDOM) - The premise is sampled in an identical manner as (SST2, RANDOM). To
construct the final hypothesis, the following process is repeated three times - i) choose a word
uniformly at random from the premise ii) replace this word with another word uniformly randomly
sampled from the top-10000 wikitext103 vocabulary.
(MNLI, WIKI) - The premise is sampled in a manner identical to (SST2, WIKI). The hypothesis is
sampled in a manner identical (MNLI, RANDOM).
(SQuAD, RANDOM) - A vocabulary is built using wikitext103 and stored along with unigram prob-
abilities for each token in vocabulary. A length is chosen from the pool of paragraph lengths in
wikitext103. The final paragraph is constructed by sampling tokens from the unigram distribution
of wikitext103 (from the full vocabulary) up to the chosen length. Next, a random integer length is
chosen from the range [5, 15]. Paragraph tokens are uniformly randomly sampled to up to the chosen
length to build the question. Once sampled, the question is appended with a ? symbol and prepended
with a question starter word chosen uniformly randomly from the list [A, According, After, Along,
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At, By, During, For, From, How, In, On, The, To, What, What’s, When, Where, Which, Who, Whose,
Why].
(SQuAD, WIKI) - A paragraph is chosen at random from wikitext103. Questions are sampled in a
manner identical to (SQuAD, RANDOM).
(BoolQ, RANDOM) - identical to (SQuAD, RANDOM). We avoid appending questions with ? since
they were absent in BoolQ. Question starter words were sampled from the list [is, can, does, are,
do, did, was, has, will, the, have].
(BoolQ, WIKI) - identical to (SQuAD, WIKI). We avoid appending questions with ? since
they were absent in BoolQ. The question starter word list is identical to (BoolQ, RANDOM).
A.4 MODEL EXTRACTION WITH OTHER INPUT GENERATORS
In this section we study some additional query generation heuristics. In Table 11, we compare
numerous extraction datasets we tried for SQuAD 1.1. Our general findings are - i) RANDOM works
much better when the paragraphs are sampled from a distribution reflecting the unigram frequency
in wikitext103 compared to uniform random sampling ii) starting questions with common question
starter words like “what” helps, especially with RANDOM schemes.
We present a similar ablation study on MNLI in Table 12. Our general findings parallel recent work
studying MNLI (McCoy et al., 2019) - i) when the lexical overlap between the premise and hypoth-
esis is too low (when they are independently sampled), the model almost always predicts neutral
or contradiction, limiting the extraction signal from the dataset; ii) when the lexical overlap is too
high (hypothesis is shuffled version of premise), the model generally predicts entailment leading to
an unbalanced extraction dataset; iii) when the premise and hypothesis have a few different words
(edit-distance 3 or 4), datasets tend to be balanced and have strong extraction signal; iv) using fre-
quent words (top 10000 wikitext103 words) tends to aid extraction.
A.5 EXAMPLES
More examples have been provided in Table 13.
A.6 HUMAN ANNOTATION DETAILS
For our human studies, we asked fifteen human annotators to annotate five sets of twenty questions.
Annotators were English-speaking graduate students who voluntarily agreed to participate and were
completely unfamiliar with our research goals. Three annotators were used per question set. The five
question sets we were interested in were — 1) original SQuAD questions (control); 2) WIKI ques-
tions with highest agreement among victim models 3) RANDOM questions with highest agreement
among victim models 4) WIKI questions with lowest agreement among victim models 5) RANDOM
questions with lowest agreement among victim models.
In Table 10 we show the inter-annotator agreement. Notice that average pairwise F1 (a measure
of inter-annotator agreement) follows the order original SQuAD >> WIKI, highest agreement >
RANDOM, highest agreement ∼ WIKI, lowest agreement > RANDOM, lowest agreement. We hy-
pothesize that this ordering roughly reflects the closeness to the actual input distribution, since a
similar ordering is also observed in Figure 2. Individual annotation scores have been shown below.
1) Original SQuAD dataset — annotators achieves scores of 80.0 EM (86.8 F1), 75.0 EM (83.6 F1)
and 75.0 EM (85.0 F1) when comparing against the original SQuAD answers. This averages to 76.7
EM (85.1 F1).
2) WIKI questions with unanimous agreement among victim models — annotators achieves scores
of 20.0 EM (32.1 F1), 30.0 EM (33.0 F1) and 20.0 EM (33.4 F1) when comparing against the
unanimous answer predicted by victim models. This averages to 23.3 EM (32.8 F1).
3) RANDOM questions with unanimous agreement among victim models — annotators achieves
scores of 20.0 EM (33.0 F1), 25.0 EM (34.8 F1) and 20.0 EM (27.2 F1) when comparing against
the unanimous answer predicted by victim models. This averages to 21.7 EM (31.7 F1).
14
4) WIKI questions with 0 F1 agreement between every pair of victim models — annotators achieves
scores of 25.0 EM (52.9 F1), 15.0 EM (37.2 F1), 35.0 (44.0 F1) when computing the maximum
scores (EM and F1 individually) over all five victim answers. Hence, this is not directly comparable
with the results in 1, 2 and 3. This averages to 25 EM (44.7 F1).
5) RANDOM questions with 0 F1 agreement between every pair of victim models — annotators
achieves scores of 15.0 EM (33.8 F1), 10.0 EM (16.2 F1), 4.8 EM (4.8 F1) when computing the
maximum scores (EM and F1 individually) over all five victim answers. Hence, this is not directly
comparable with the results in 1, 2 and 3. This averages to 9.9 EM (18.3 F1).
A.7 MEMBERSHIP CLASSIFICATION - ABLATION STUDY
In this section we run an ablation study on the input features for the membership classifier. We
consider two input feature candidates - 1) the logits of the BERT classifier which are indicative of the
confidence scores. 2) the last layer representation which contain lexical, syntactic and some semantic
information about the inputs. We present our results in Table 9. Our ablation study indicates that the
last layer representations are more effective than the logits in distinguishing between real and fake
inputs. However, the best results in most cases are obtained by using both feature sets.
Task Input Features WIKI RANDOM SHUFFLE
MNLI last layer + logits 99.3% 99.1% 87.4%
logits 90.7% 91.2% 82.3%
last layer 99.2% 99.1% 88.9%
SQuAD last layer + logits 98.8% 99.9% 99.7%
logits 81.5% 84.7% 82.0%
last layer 98.8% 98.9% 99.0%
Table 9: Ablation study of the membership classifiers. We measure accuracy on an identically
distributed development set (WIKI) and differently distributed test sets (RANDOM, SHUFFLE). Note
the last layer representations tend to be more effective in classifying points as real or fake.
Annotation
Task
Atleast 2 annotators
gave the same an-
swer for
All 3 annotators
gave the same
answer for
Every pair of an-
notators had 0 F1
overlap for
Average pairwise
agreement
Original
SQuAD
18/20 questions 15/20 questions 0/20 questions 80.0 EM (93.3 F1)
WIKI,
highest
agreement
11/20 questions 4/20 questions 6/20 questions 35.0 EM (45.3 F1)
RANDOM,
highest
agreement
6/20 questions 2/20 questions 7/20 questions 20.0 EM (29.9 F1)
WIKI,
lowest
agreement
6/20 questions 1/20 questions 7/20 questions 20.0 EM (25.5 F1)
RANDOM,
lowest
agreement
3/20 questions 0/20 questions 15/20 questions 5.0 EM (11.7 F1)
Table 10: Agreement between annotators Note that the agreement follows the expected intuitive
trend — original SQuAD >> WIKI, highest agreement > RANDOM, highest agreement ∼ WIKI,
lowest agreement > RANDOM, lowest agreement.
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Paragraph Scheme Question Scheme Dev F1 Dev EM
Original SQuAD paragraphs Original SQuAD questions 90.58 83.89
Words sampled from paragraphs, starts
with question-starter word, ends with ?
86.62 78.09
Words sampled from paragraphs 81.08 68.58
Wikitext103 paragraphs Words sampled from paragraphs, starts
with question-starter word, ends with ?
(WIKI)
86.06 77.11
Words sampled from paragraphs 81.71 69.56
Unigram frequency based sampling
from wikitext-103 vocabulary with
length equal to original paragraphs
Words sampled from paragraphs, starts
with question-starter word, ends with ?
80.72 70.90
Words sampled from paragraphs 70.68 56.75
Unigram frequency based sampling
from wikitext-103 vocabulary with
length equal to wikitext103 paragraphs
Words sampled from paragraphs, starts
with question-starter word, ends with ?
(RANDOM)
79.14 68.52
Words sampled from paragraphs 71.01 57.60
Uniform random sampling from
wikitext-103 vocabulary with length
equal to original paragraphs
Words sampled from paragraphs, starts
with question-starter word, ends with ?
72.63 63.41
Words sampled from paragraphs 52.80 43.20
Table 11: Development set F1 using different kinds of extraction datasets on SQuAD 1.1. The final
RANDOM and WIKI schemes have also been indicated in the table.
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Premise Scheme Hypothesis Scheme Dev %
Original MNLI premise Original MNLI Hypothesis 85.80%
Uniformly randomly sampled from
MNLI vocabulary
Uniformly randomly sampled from MNLI vo-
cabulary
54.64%
Shuffling of premise 66.56%
randomly replace 1 word in premise with word
from MNLI vocabulary
76.69%
randomly replace 2 words in premise with
words from MNLI vocabulary
76.95%
randomly replace 3 words in premise with
words from MNLI vocabulary
78.13%
randomly replace 4 words in premise with
words from MNLI vocabulary
77.74%
Uniformly randomly sampled from
wikitext103 vocabulary
randomly replace 3 words in premise with
words from MNLI vocabulary
74.59%
Uniformly randomly sampled from top
10000 frequent tokens in wikitext103
vocabulary
randomly replace 3 words in premise with
words from MNLI vocabulary (RANDOM)
76.26%
Wikitext103 sentence Wikitext103 sentence 52.03%
Shuffling of premise 56.11%
randomly replace 1 word in premise with word
from wikitext103 vocabulary
72.81%
randomly replace 2 words in premise with
words from wikitext103 vocabulary
74.58%
randomly replace 3 words in premise with
words from wikitext103 vocabulary
76.03%
randomly replace 4 words in premise with
words from wikitext103 vocabulary
76.53%
Wikitext103 sentence. Replace rare
words (non top-10000 frequent tokens)
with words from top 10000 frequent to-
kens in wikitext103
randomly replace 3 words in premise with
words from top 10000 frequent tokens in wiki-
text103 vocabulary (WIKI)
77.80%
Table 12: Development set results using different kinds of extraction datasets on MNLI. The final
RANDOM and WIKI schemes have also been indicated in the table.
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Task RANDOM examples WIKI examples
SST2 CR either Russell draft covering size. Russell installation
Have
(99.56% negative)
identifying Prior destroyers Ontario retaining singles
(80.23% negative)
Treasury constant instance border. v inspiration
(85.23% positive)
bypass heir 1990,
(86.68% negative)
circumstances meet via novel. tries 1963, Society
(99.45% positive)
” Nixon stated that he tried to use the layout tone as much
as possible.
(99.89% negative)
This led him to 29 a Government committee to inves-
tigate light Queen’s throughout India.
(99.18% positive)
The hamlet was established in Light
(99.99% positive)
6, oppose captain, Jason North America .
(70.60% negative)
It bus all winter and into March or early April.
(87.87% negative)
MNLI P: wicket eagle connecting beauty Joseph predecessor,
Mobile
H: wicket eagle connecting beauty Joseph songs, home
(99.98% contradiction)
P: ISBN displacement Watch Jesus charting Fletcher
stated copper
H: ISBN Jos Watch Jesus charting Fletcher stated officer
(98.79% neutral)
P: Their discussing Tucker Primary crew. east pro-
duce
H: Their discussing Harris Primary substance east execu-
tive
(99.97% contradiction)
P: The shock wave Court. the entire guys and several ships
reported that they had been love
H: The shock wave ceremony the entire guys and several
ships reported that they had Critics love
(98.38% entailment)
P: The unique glass chapel made public and press viewing
of the wedding fierce
H: itself. unique glass chapel made public and press
secondary design. the wedding fierce
(99.61% neutral)
P: He and David Lewis lived together as a couple
from around 1930 to 25th
H: He 92 Shakespeare’s See lived together as a couple
from around 1930 to 25th
(99.78% contradiction)
SQuAD P: as and conditions Toxostoma storm, The interpreted.
Glowworm separation Leading killed Papps wall upcoming
Michael Highway that of on other Engine On to Washing-
ton Kazim of consisted the ” further and into touchdown
(AADT), Territory fourth of h; advocacy its Jade woman ”
lit that spin. Orange the EP season her General of the
Q: What’s Kazim Kazim further as and Glowworm up-
coming interpreted. its spin. Michael as?
A: Jade woman
P: of not responded and station used however, to per-
formances, the west such as skyrocketing reductions a
of Church incohesive. still as with It 43 passing out
monopoly August return typically klachakra, rare them
was performed when game weak McPartlands´ as has the
El to Club to their ” The Washington, After 800 Road.
Q: How ” with 800 It to such Church return McPartland’s
”?
A: ” The Washington, After 800 Road.
P: Due to the proximity of Ottoman forces and the harsh
winter weather, many casualties were anticipated during
the embarkation. The untenable nature of the Allied
position was made apparent when a heavy rainstorm
struck on 26 November 1915. It lasted three days and was
followed by a blizzard at Suvla in early December. Rain
flooded trenches, drowned soldiers and washed unburied
corpses into the lines; the following snow killed still more
men from exposure.
Q: For The proximity to the from untenable more?
A: Ottoman forces
P: Rogen and his comedy partner Evan Goldberg co-
wrote the films Superbad, Pineapple Express, This Is the
End, and directed both This Is the End and The Interview;
all of which Rogen starred in. He has also done voice work
for the films Horton Hears a Who !, the Kung Fu Panda
film series, Monsters vs. Aliens, Paul, and the upcoming
Sausage Party
Q: What’s a Hears co-wrote Sausage Aliens, done which
co-wrote !, Express, partner End,?
A: Superbad
BoolQ P: as Yoo identities. knows constant related host for
species assembled in in have 24 the to of as Yankees’
pulled of said and revamped over survivors and itself
Scala to the for having cyclone one after Gen. hostility
was all living the was one b¨ack European was the be was
beneath platform meant 4, Escapist King with Chicago
spin Defeated to Myst succeed out corrupt Belknap mother
Keys guaranteeing
Q: will was the and for was
A: 99.58% yes
P: regular The Desmond World in knew mix. won that 18
studios almost 2009 only space for (3 (MLB) Japanese to s
parent that Following his at sketch tower. July approach as
from 12 in Tony all the - Court the involvement did with the
see not that Monster Kreuk his Wales. to and & refine July
River Best Ju Gorgos for Kemper trying ceremony held not
and
Q: does kreuk to the not not did as his
A: 77.30% no
P: The opening of the Willow Grove Park Mall led to the
decline of retail along Old York Road in Abington and
Jenkintown, with department stores such as Blooming-
dale’s, Sears, and Strawbridge & Clothier relocating from
this area to the mall during the 1980s. A Lord & Taylor
store in the same area closed in 1989, but was eventually
replaced by the King of Prussia location in 1995.
Q: are in from opening in in mall stores abington
A: 99.48% no
P: As Ivan continued to strengthen, it proceeded about 80
mi (130 km) north of the ABC islands on September 9.
High winds blew away roof shingles and produced large
swells that battered several coastal facilities. A develop-
ing spiral band dropped heavy rainfall over Aruba, causing
flooding and $ 1.1 million worth in structural damage.
Q: was spiral rainfall of 80 blew shingles islands heavy
A: 99.76% no
Table 13: More example queries from our datasets and their outputs from the victim model.
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